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Much of the research carried out in the field of Development Economics is concerned with 
identifying causes of- and remedies for persistent poverty, either at the micro- or 
macroeconomic level. One of the most robust findings of the recent literature on poverty 
traps is that lack of productive assets plays a key role (Journal of Development Studies 
special issue 42(2), including South African evidence in Adato et al., 2006). Given the 
importance of agriculture in the livelihoods of the world’s poor, the development of the 
literature on poverty traps has led to renewed interest for one of the most ubiquitous of 
development policies, namely land reform. But despite the recent waves of land reforms in 
South Africa, Brazil, Colombia and the Philippines, data availability remains a major 
constraint in estimating the welfare impact of land transfers at the household level. 
 
Black South Africans experienced a long history of land deprivation, so that the economic 
and political case for land reform appeared particularly strong at the collapse of the 
apartheid regime (Lipton and Lipton, 1993; Binswanger and Deininger, 1993; Eastwood et 
al., 2006). An ambitious three tiers land reform policy was devised with the aim of 
redistributing 30 per cent of the country’s agricultural land from white landowners to black 
people. The largest component, the so called land redistribution component, on which this 
paper focuses, enables black land grant applicants to buy land from white willing-sellers. 
But 14 years after the emergence of the ‘new South Africa’, less than 5 per cent of South 
Africa’s land has been redistributed (Lahiff, 2007), as opposed to the initial overall target 
of redistributing 30 per cent of the country’s agricultural land by 1999. Based on existing 
analyses, most of which are case studies, land redistribution does not seem to be improving 
the livelihoods of its beneficiaries. There is therefore a pressing need for a systematic 
evaluation of the impact of land redistribution in this country. 
 
Combined quantitative and qualitative `Q-squared’ studies are a growing phenomenon in 
Development Economics (Rao and Ibáñez, 2005; Journal of Development Studies special 
issue 42(2); World Development special issue 35(2)) which has developed in part, as before 
it Rapid Rural Appraisal techniques, as a result of the often severe data limitations faced by 
researchers in the discipline. Although the main motivation behind these studies is usually 
a willingness to understand complex phenomena such as poverty more in depth, and 
according to standards that resonate amongst the individuals concerned, lack of satisfactory 
survey data is arguably behind several of the reasons for ‘squaring the Q’ put forward by 
Kanbur and Shaffer (2007, pp. 183-184), such as `[interpret] counterintuitive findings from  
 
   
 
household surveys’, `probe motivations underlying observed behaviour’, `suggest the 
direction of causality’ and `assess the validity of quantitative results’. Indeed, if sufficiently 
detailed and reliable data existed for the purpose of a given study, then these, but not all, 
motivations for ‘squaring the Q’ would disappear. 
 
This paper combines a quantitative analysis based on a national South African household 
survey, which allows identifying land grant recipients but does not contain any more detail 
regarding participation in land reform, and a qualitative analysis based on primary data 
collected specifically to triangulate and complement the quantitative investigation.
1 This 
study contributes to the literature on the impact of land transfers through a cost-benefit 
analysis of participation in South African land reform projects at the household level, and 
by investigating the correlates of participation gains using qualitative data. In addition, it 
contributes a methodological innovation to the emerging `Q-squared’ (or quantitative 
×qualitative) literature. More specifically, it exploits the cross-province heterogeneity of 
the econometrically estimated impact of participation to guide the case study sampling 
strategy, in order to improve the generalisability of the qualitative findings. 
 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section II reviews key features of the South 
African land reform and the existing evidence on the impact of the land redistribution 
programme on the livelihoods of its beneficiaries, Section III presents econometric 
evidence based on Statistics South Africa’s Labour Force Survey and motivates the 
qualitative analysis, Section IV introduces the methodological approach used for the 
combined analysis, Sections V and VI present the qualitative findings, and Section VII 
concludes. 
 
2.  Specifications of the South African Land Reform Programme and 
Existing Evidence 
Specificities of the South African Land Reform Programme 
The South African context differs from a typical `land to the tiller’ land reform on several 
grounds, including the lack of farming human capital among the targeted group (Cross et al., 
1996; Bradstock, 2005).
2  Furthermore, often long distances separate the beneficiaries’ 
current place of residence and the land of which they acquire ownership. Moreover, until at 
least May 2008, when the value of these grants was revised significantly upwards, 
beneficiaries had to pool their grants and acquire farms as an entity of anything up to several 
hundreds of households. Although commercial farms have evolved to be generally quite  
 
   
 
large due to past agricultural policies, up to mid-2001, beneficiaries were given a grant of 
only R16,000 per household. Despite a policy change in 2001 giving birth to LRAD (Land 
Redistribution for Agricultural Development) and through which R20,000 or larger grants 
could be obtained when matched with own equity, pooling remained the rule over the period 
considered in this paper as most applicants brought no or very little financial contribution.
3 
Finally, collective forms of ownership have been favoured by authorities, even under LRAD, 
and although it does not follow directly from this that land is operated by the beneficiaries as 
a group, business plans drawn by consultants as part of the land grant application process 
usually promote the use of the redistributed farms as a single, capital-intensive commercial 
entity, in line with the organisation of production under the previous owner (van den Brink et 
al., 2006). 
Existing Evidence 
As would be expected given the overwhelmingly negative record of agricultural collectives 
(Deininger, 1995), land transfers do not seem to be contributing to the livelihoods of a 
substantial share of the households involved. Only 8.1 per cent of the beneficiary 
households surveyed in Ahmed et al. (2003, p.189) report achieving a higher income and 
only 11.1 per cent achieving a more secure income as a consequence of participation in 
land redistribution. In his case studies of land reform projects in the Northern Cape, 
Bradstock (2005) finds that, while household incomes have increased during the period of 
observation (2001-2003), agricultural income from land redistribution is not the cause of 
this increase. In his study of communal land redistribution projects (Communal Property 
Associations) carried out between 1999 and 2001 in Limpopo, McCusker (2002, p.113) 
finds that `change in livelihoods as a result of land reform [is] minimal largely due to 
general disorganisation, farm size problems, lack of capital, lack of skills and labour, 
gender bias, and skewed age distribution’. More specifically, he reports that only 21.1 per 
cent feel that their income has increased, whereas 55.8 per cent of respondents say that 
their income has stayed the same, and, more worryingly, 23.1 per cent say that it has 
dropped (McCusker, 2002, p. 117). Deininger and May (2000) find that, for 84 per cent of 
land reform projects in their sample, the median gross annual revenue per beneficiary is 
slightly negative at -R9. The impression that benefits are generally small or non-existent is 
confirmed by van Zyl et al. (2001), Lodge (2003), Aliber (2003), Borras (2005), Walker 
(2005), and van den Brink et al. (2006). 
 
However, there is a dearth of systematic evidence of the impact of participation and 
determinants of participation gains. In particular, no study documents the costs and benefits   
 
   
 
of participation in land reform projects at the household level, and only one analysis offers 
indirect econometric estimates of the income effect of land redistribution at the household 
level, namely Valente (2009). Using Statistics South Africa’s Labour Force Survey and 
General Household Survey, this previous study finds that beneficiary households are more 
food insecure than non-beneficiaries after controlling for a number of socio-economic, 
cultural, demographic, and regional characteristics. These results are obtained from 
propensity score matching and are thus robust to observed variable bias. However, as 
acknowledged in this previous study, data limitations imply that the robustness check 
proposed in Valente (2009) to test the sensitivity of these results to unobserved variable 
bias relies on distributional assumptions, and thus deserve further scrutiny. Here we 
confront these quantitative, survey-based, results to data obtained through more intensive 
data collection methods, and investigate correlates of participation outcomes. 
 
3.  Quantitative Findings Based on Secondary Data 
Data Description 
The Labour Force Survey (LFS) has been conducted by Statistics South Africa every six 
months since February 2000.
4 This data is not specifically designed to analyse the impact 
of the land redistribution policy, which limits estimation possibilities. As a consequence of 
the cross-sectional nature of the data, it is not possible to estimate the impact of receiving a 
land grant by comparing beneficiary welfare before and after participation, which warrants 
attention to the usual estimation biases. In addition, since the issue of land redistribution is 
only peripheral in the LFS, one is confronted with several difficulties when trying to 
estimate the impact on welfare of benefiting from the land redistribution policy. Firstly, the 
sampling of observations is based on the population census and income strata and not on 
the number of beneficiaries per geographical unit or/and type of land acquisition scheme, 
so that the sample of beneficiaries in the LFS is not necessarily representative of the land 
grant beneficiary population. However, there is no reason why it should be regarded as 
non-randomly biased towards a certain type of beneficiaries (see Appendix A1 for further 
discussion). Moreover, there is no land-reform specific module, so that we do not have 
information regarding land use and characteristics, access to complementary factors and 
extension services, participation-related costs and benefits, or the date at which the land 
grant has been received. As a consequence, the data do not allow a close investigation of 
the different channels through which participation in land reform impacts on household 
welfare, so the LFS data analysis focuses instead on the global effect on food security 
status.  
 
   
 
Nonetheless, the use of LFS data allows deriving useful insights on an important aspect of 
the welfare impact of land redistribution, namely food security. In four of the available 
waves (September 2001, 2002, 2003, and 2004), the survey questionnaire asks respondents 
whether they received `a land grant to obtain a plot of land for residence or for farming?’, 
as well as `In the past 12 months, how often, if ever, did this household have problems 
satisfying their food needs? Never/Seldom/Sometimes/Often/Always’. From the latter, one 
can derive an indicator equal to one if the respondent reports problems in satisfying the 
household’s food needs `sometimes’ to `always’, and zero otherwise. In the following, 
households are considered to be food insecure when this variable is equal to one. 
Households are counted as `beneficiaries’, `participants’, or `treated’ if they report 
receiving a land grant. 
 
The method used here is nearest neighbour propensity score matching (PSM). PSM 
involves estimating the probability for a household to receive a land grant as a function of a 
set of relevant characteristics, or `propensity score’, and then matching treated and non-
treated observations with comparable propensity scores to obtain the average difference in 
the food insecurity indicator between treated and control households, or `average treatment 
effect on the treated’. The main drawback is that these estimates can only be interpreted as 
the effect of receiving a land grant if, once the observed characteristics included in the 
propensity score are controlled for, there is no remaining unobserved variable bias (see 
Valente (2009) for further details). 
Econometric Results 
As could be expected from the nationwide, round-by-round, analysis in Valente (2009), 
estimates from the four pooled LFS rounds (2001-2004) indicate that, on average, 
participants in the land grant scheme are more food insecure than non-participants with 
similar socioeconomic, demographic, and cultural characteristics listed in the column 
headers of Table 1 and detailed in Appendix Table A2. 
However, there are nine provinces in South Africa, and these vary substantially in terms of 
development levels, macroeconomic, geographical, and institutional characteristics. In 
particular, land reform implementation is largely decentralised, so that land reform 
practices and performance are likely to vary across provinces. This has been noted in 
Deininger and May (2000), and is apparent in other studies such as Ahmed et al. (2003). 
When carrying out the PSM procedure separately for each province, it appears that regional 
variation in the correlation between land reform participation and household food 
insecurity is also visible in the LFS. In particular, it appears that the finding that land  
 
   
 
reform beneficiaries are more food insecure than comparable non-beneficiaries is least 
robust for the province of Limpopo. Interestingly, Deininger and May (2000) also find that 
project incomes are highest in Limpopo (and the Western Cape – which does not show 
here). On the other hand, the quantitative finding that beneficiaries are at a food security 
disadvantage seems to hold systematically in other provinces, such as Mpumalanga 
(Limpopo’s neighbour) where the correlation is of `average’ magnitude and based on a 
comparatively large number of beneficiaries. It is interesting to remark that the figures 
reported in Deininger and May (2000) also indicate that project performance in 
Mpumalanga was close to the national average at that early stage of the reform. 
As explained in Section IV below, this hierarchy is exploited to improve the 
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Source: sample of households headed by a black individual in Statistics South Africa’s Labour Force 
Survey. Provincial samples are obtained by stacking the four LFS surveys for which the relevant 
information is available, namely the September 2001, 2002, 2003 and 2004 rounds. Nearest neighbour 
matching algorithm by Leuven and Sianesi (2003). Bootstrapped standard errors (in brackets) partially 
correct for the fact that some observations may be sampled in more than one round, but cannot be identified 
between rounds. The balancing property is satisfied for all estimates. Namely, individual t-tests cannot 
reject the equality of means for beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries for each regressor included in the 
propensity score equation. 
asee Appendix Table A2 for further details. 
 b of these 2,319 households, 2,279 
could be matched. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
 
4.  Qualitative Analysis: Methodological Approach 
Sampling Strategy Based on Econometric Findings 
As noted in the previous section, there is important inter-provincial variation in the 
estimated effect of receiving a land grant, with Limpopo showing the most encouraging 
results, contrary to neighbouring Mpumalanga, where we find that land grantees are 
significantly more food insecure than comparable non-grantees. In order to exploit this  
 
   
 
provincial variation, we asked the `monitoring and evaluation’ land reform official in 
Limpopo to draw a list of (six) land reform projects particularly successful and (six) 
particularly unsuccessful in `improving the economic situation of their members’, from 
which we sampled three successful and two unsuccessful instances, after cross-checking 
their classification with project officers from the Provincial Land Reform Office (PLRO) 
and local officials from the Department of Agriculture (DoA).
5 
 
According to the DoA’s extension officer interviewed in this province, out of the 32 group 
projects known to him and on which he felt it was not too early to make a judgement, only 
6 were `showing a little light of development’ rather than blatantly failing at the start of 
data collection, namely January 2007.
6  This suggests that successful projects, which 
constitute (purposefully) three out of five projects, are very probably over-sampled in our 
Limpopo sample. The three particularly successful projects can be seen as what is known in 
the social sciences literature as `critical cases’ (Flyvbjerg, 2004), in the sense that, if even 
particularly successful projects in the best-performing province (Limpopo) are found not to 
improve the livelihoods of their beneficiaries, then it gives support to the idea that most 
beneficiaries in the country are not truly `benefiting’ from participation. On the other hand, 
sampling two particularly unsuccessful projects in Limpopo helps identifying causes for 
success/failure holding constant common province-specific factors. 
 
Four more projects were sampled, all in the Ehlanzeni district of Mpumalanga, for which 
we could obtain a list of all existing projects from the authorities. Whilst three were 
sampled randomly from the PLRO’s listing, a fourth one was purposefully sampled (MP4). 
The decision to sample this additional project was motivated by the fact that, amongst the 
other three, there was an instance of a particular type of project which was likely to be 
quite different from the other types of redistribution projects, namely a labour tenant 
project (MP3). Such projects refer to a land transfer from the previous owner to households 
who used to live on this or another nearby farm under very insecure tenancy rights in 
exchange of their labour. An additional labour tenant project (MP4) was thus added to the 
sample to prevent misinterpretation of idiosyncratic characteristics of MP3 as general traits 
of labour tenant projects. 
Details of the sampling of households to be interviewed within projects can be found in 
Appendix B1. Data collection took place in January 2007 in Limpopo and in February and 
March 2007 in Mpumalanga.   
 
   
 
Instruments for Data Collection 
The four core instruments used for the field work were: focus group discussions in each 
project (except LP5, a small family project which had disintegrated by the time of data 
collection), household interviews using structured questionnaires (two interviews per 
sampled household, times four to six households per project except LP5), interviews of the 
project leaders using semi-structured questionnaires, and interviews with key informants 




Table 2: Key Characteristics of Sampled Projects 
  LP1 LP2 LP3 LP4 LP5 MP1  MP2  MP3  MP4 







Date  of  land  transfer 1997 1998 2005 2003 2003 1997 1997 2004 2006 
Formal  beneficiaries
a  398  126  97  30 9 26  200  33  38 
Active beneficiaries
b  110  46  8  6  1  10 20 33 38 
Land area (hectares)  2240  1655  177  24  9  28  265  214  188 
           
Activities:           
Collective livestock  √  √  √  √      
Collective crops  √  √  √  √  √  √    
Individual livestock  √         √  √ 
Individual crops  √       √  √  √ 
           
Functioning at the time 
of study:  Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes No Yes Yes 
           
Province  Limpopo Limpopo Limpopo Limpopo Limpopo  Mpumalanga  Mpumalanga  Mpumalanga  Mpumalanga 
Basis for sampling
c + + + -  -  random  random  random  labour  tenant 
SLAG = Settlement and Land Acquisition Grant. LRAD = Land Redistribution for Agricultural Development. 
a Number of land grants, namely, for SLAG projects, number of 
beneficiary households and, for LRAD, number of individual beneficiaries. 
b at the time of data collection. 
 c a `+’ stands for `purposefully sampled as successful’ and a `-‘ for 
`purposefully sampled as unsuccessful’. 
  
5.  Cost and Benefit Analysis 
For brevity’s sake, no narrative summary of the projects sampled is included in the body of 
the paper but an overview can be found in Appendix C. The main conclusion of the analysis 
detailed below can be summarised in a synthetic proposition: 
 
A small number of beneficiaries experience, at some stage, net material benefits as a 
consequence of their participation in land redistribution projects. However, the majority of 
beneficiaries incur small net losses in terms of financial costs (transport, seeds and other 
small production costs, cash contributions to the farm’s collective activity) which are 
reciprocated neither with monetary gains nor in kind. In addition, this phenomenon does not 
appear to be transitory. 
 
To ease the reading of this analysis, the names of projects sampled purposefully as successful 
are in bold (LP1, LP2, LP3), those of projects sampled purposefully as unsuccessful are in 
italic (LP5, LP4), and those of labour tenants’ projects underlined (MP3, MP4) from here 
onwards. A discussion of data quality and details of how non-trivial household variables 
mentioned in the analysis were built can be found in the Appendix (in Appendix B2 and 
Appendix Table B2, respectively). 
 
Costs and Benefits of Participation at the Household Level 
Except for the labour tenants projects (MP3 and MP4), gross gains in kind are directed only 
to the small number of beneficiaries who manage to use productively their individual plot 
(LP1, MP1), to those who participate in a collective activity involving a subset of project 
members and where part of the production is distributed between participants (20 
beneficiaries out of 126 in LP2 two years before data collection, and six in the previous 
year) or, in the case of LP4 and LP5, to those who bend the rules to their advantage. 
Indeed, in LP4 and LP5, one or two members in each project have managed to get a 
significant gain out of the enterprise by stealing money and/or assets. As for monetary 
gains, except in the case of LP2 where dividends are now being distributed to all active 
members, money transfers are only received by the few beneficiaries who are employed 
fulltime by the project (two out of 398 in LP1, eight out of 97 members in LP3; three out 
of 200 households in MP2, in 1998 and 1999 only).  
  
 
   
 
In total, if we exclude the two labour tenant projects, only a small proportion (between one 
or two person in MP1 and LP5, to just over a third in LP2) has received anything at all 
from the project, and benefits in kind or cash have only been received for a short period of 
time.   
 
Gross benefits by project, as reported by the households interviewed individually, are 
summarised in columns (10) and (11) of Table 3. One may want to be cautious with the 
crop production reported by the two larger producers out of the five households 
interviewed in MP4, whose reported harvest seems rather unrealistic (over R40,000). Still, 
the average value of production for the three other households in this project is nearly 
R5,200 for the year preceding data collection (about US$745), so that excluding this outlier 
does not affect much the overall conclusion regarding benefits to participation in this 
project.  
 
Benefits were thus only obtained by a few beneficiaries, and not throughout the whole life 
of the project, at least for non-labour tenants’ projects. On the contrary, costs (for instance: 
time, labour, effort, telephone and transport costs, and other production costs) are borne by 
most beneficiaries and for longer periods of time.   
 
Household-level data was collected about financial costs incurred (see Table 3), but no 
attempt was made at valuing the opportunity costs induced by participation in terms of 
labour and capital invested in the project both because financial costs are subject to less 
recall bias and because it is hard to find a reliable shadow price for these factors of 
production in the context of this study. The financial costs reported here should therefore 
be seen as a lower bound of the true economic costs entailed. 
 
In total, net benefits appear positive for all the households surveyed within a given project 
only for LP3 and MP3. On the other hand, all households interviewed in LP1, LP4, and 
MP1, and at least one household in LP2, MP4, and MP2 have experienced net losses so far. 
In addition, in LP5, the collapsed project in which household interviews could not be 
carried out and is thus not mentioned in Table 3, project members worked for no salary for 
two years and only the two corrupt leaders obtained any reward from participation. Within 
each project, net benefits are quite heterogeneous, which motivates the analysis of 
determinants of success and failure at the household level as well as the project level. 
Furthermore, these net benefits might convey an overly optimistic picture of the individual  
 
   
 
gains in a given project as, despite our best efforts to contact members who have deserted 
the projects, we could, in nearly all cases, only interview members who are still involved, 
and who may well be those benefiting most from participation. 
In all projects, a consequent number of people are reported to have left at an early post-
transfer stage either very rapidly, as they realised that the objectives of the majority were 
not compatible with theirs (LP2, LP1), or, as most formal beneficiaries did, after a few 
years due to disappointing results. In both cases, it implies that non-negligible costs were 
incurred before any gains were obtained. The following extract summarises what was said 
in focus groups about project desertion. 
 
 `when [they] started, [they] were hoping they would take all [their] produce home, so everybody was active, 
but then people started withdrawing their participation because there was nothing being produced. [They] tell 
me: you are always talking about this farm that does not produce anything (…) You know, they always 
complain to say that they don’t have money to buy manure, don’t have money to buy seedlings, you see that’s 
why they withdrew, because they were spending their money to plant as we said before, planting using their 
best efforts, but at the end of the day, the cattle would just come in and destroy everything, that’s why they 
withdrew, because they were just losing everything’ (A focus group participant at MP1).  
  
 
   
 
Table 3: Costs and Benefits of Participation for Interviewed Households 
  Costs    Costs    Gross Benefits    Net Benefits 
  Total overheads since application 
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  n/a  12,733 
(10,000-18,000) 
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 671 
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 107 
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 -192.3 





















































(-5,694 to -95) 
Each cell contains the relevant project mean, in Rand, with min-max values in parentheses. A category is `n/a’ when no such activity is carried out on project land. Below project names is 
the number of households on which the figures are based. 
a the larger sample size applies to columns (1) to (6) and the smaller to the other columns because we were unable to carry out the 
second household interview with one of the project’s household. 
bThis corresponds to the 12 months preceding the interview for all projects except MP2, for which production stopped in 
1999. 
c Define n = years since land grant application. Net benefits are obtained as follows: (12) = (10) + (11) – [(6)/n + (7) + (8) + (9)], where [(6)/n + (7) + (8) + (9)] is the average total 
yearly cost of participation. 
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Evolution of Benefits over Time 
In all projects except the labour tenants’, benefits, when they exist, are received for a short 
period of time only. This period of time sometimes comes after initially difficult years 
(LP1, LP2), but, at least as often, the project is only functioning for the first one or two 
year(s) as in MP2, LP4, and LP5, and stops subsequently. In addition, for LP4 and LP5, 
only their corrupt leaders got any benefit from the functioning of the project. There is 
therefore no apparent reason to think that the lack of profitability of participation in land 
reform projects is only transitory and that higher gains should be expected in the longer 
run. This is in line with the econometric finding in Valente (2009) that the estimate of the 
participation effect based on the 2004 round of the LFS is no more encouraging than that 
based on the 2001 round. 
Generalisability of Findings 
In both the focus group discussions and the interviews with the project authorities, 
beneficiaries were not only asked about the economic impact of participation on their 
project’s households, but also on the impact for households in other land redistribution 
projects that they know of. Beneficiaries in labour tenants’ projects reported positive 
impressions of the economic impact of land transfers on their recipients. In all other 
projects, the image depicted was negative (`some are able to feed themselves and some are 
not. Members are generally dissatisfied economically’ (informant in LP2)) to very negative 
(`Many of the people in these projects are unemployed, and they still have to pop out their 
own money out of their own pockets to run the projects, money which was supposed to 
feed their families, and at the end of the day, nothing comes and they are not reaping any 
benefits, so they end up losing interest and leave the projects’ (informant in LP4)).  
The overall negative impression of land reform beneficiaries on the economic impact of 
participation at large is confirmed by the perceptions of key informants. Out of seven key 
informants asked about the impact of participation on the economic situation of the 
beneficiaries, the two most positive answers were that things were difficult for beneficiaries 
at the beginning but that after some time, they `developed strategies’ to obtain some 
benefits from the projects (informant at PLRO Limpopo) and that `generally what [they] 
can say is that in most of [their] projects, to be honest, you do find passive beneficiaries, 
where you’ll find that though a project is bought for 10, only one or two are really 
benefiting economically’ (informant at PLRO Mpumalanga). The other key informants to 
whom the question was put all suggested that most beneficiaries were actually made 
economically worse-off by participation.  
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Both the voices of the beneficiaries consulted and those of key informants suggest that the 
findings regarding net benefits from participation based on the nine projects sampled can 
be generalised to other projects. But the most important point in the exploration of the 
generalisability of these findings to projects outside the sample rests on the sampling 
strategy adopted. 
 
Recall that Limpopo is the province in which the econometric finding that land grant 
recipients were more food insecure than non-beneficiaries is least robust, and for which 
mean revenue per beneficiary was highest in 1998/1999 according to Deininger and May 
(2000). In this ‘best performing province’, only a small minority of projects were judged to 
be bringing about some benefits to their participants according to the province’s extension 
officer interviewed (6 out of 32 projects under his supervision). In the three purposefully 
sampled ‘best performing projects in the best performing province’, only a handful of 
beneficiaries appear to derive net gains from their participation, whilst a remaining 
majority of their formal beneficiaries, most of them having now deserted the projects, incur 
small to moderate losses. This suggests that, in the country at large, the average beneficiary 
is unlikely to derive any net financial benefit (in cash or kind) from participation. 
 
In Mpumalanga, PSM estimates indicate that the food insecurity effect of receiving a land 
grant is robust and of roughly average magnitude, and mean revenue per beneficiary was 
closest to the national average in 1998/1999 according to figures in Deininger and May 
(2000). Three out of the four projects sampled in this province were sampled randomly 
from the pool of projects in the Ehlanzeni district. It is unclear whether this district has a 
higher or lower rate of success in land reform participation than the rest of the province, 
although interviews with key informants suggest that there is no noticeable difference. One 
important exception, however, is that there are fewer of the projects that seem most 
beneficial to their participants (namely, labour tenant projects) in this district compared to 
other districts in Mpumalanga. This potential bias is tackled by over-sampling these 
projects (so that they represent half of the Mpumalanga sample). In the two non-labour 
tenant projects, which were sampled randomly, only one of the eight households 
interviewed had positive net participation gains. Again, since labour tenant projects are 
only found in Mpumalanga and Kwazulu-Natal, these findings give support to the 
econometric result that the average beneficiary is not likely to be truly benefiting from 
participation in land redistribution projects.  
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6.  Causes of Failure and Success 
 
Credit Constraints 
Whilst Deininger and May (2000) find that the proportion of poor beneficiaries is higher in 
better projects, other studies suggest that benefits of project participation may be captured 
by an `élite’ (Hall et al. 2003; Bradstock, 2005; Lebert and Rhode, 2007). One could think 
that many of the problems faced by land reform beneficiaries would be less widespread 
amongst better-off people, such as the lack of management skills, risk management, and of 
course, capital. On the other hand, the advantages of richer individuals regarding their 
access to complementary production factors, and to capital in particular, are not very likely 
to translate into more positive participation outcomes if they are involved in a project 
where there is no individual use of the land, as is the case in five out of the nine projects 
sampled (LP2, LP3, LP5, LP4, MP2), where the farm is used solely for production by the 
collective enterprise. 
 
Better-off households may also incur higher costs from participation, as they are over-
represented among project leaders. Indeed, data collected in households’ structured 
interviews show a positive (but not significant) correlation between financial costs of 
participation and initial wealth when measured by the initial ownership of livestock, capital 
goods, and durable goods. But the correlation between initial wealth and gross or net gains 
is more ambiguous: there is a positive correlation between gains and initial livestock 
ownership, but negative correlations between gains and both capital and durable goods 
ownership (see Figures 1 and 2 and definitions in Appendix Table B2). In the case of 
livestock ownership, these correlations are all significant at the five per cent level, but 
driven by labour tenants (see Figure 1 below). For ownership of capital and durable goods, 
all correlations are insignificant at usual levels. It is thus unclear whether capital constraints 
at the household level play an important role in the individual benefits derived by project 
members. This is consistent with the finding in Valente (2009) of only limited evidence of 
wealth-dependent participation outcomes, as the effect of receiving a land grant does not 
appear to significantly vary with wealth, except for one out of the six datasets analysed in 
this previous paper.  
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Figure 1: Relationship Between Initial Livestock Ownership and Costs  
                  and Benefits of Participation 





Figure 2: Relationship Between Initial Ownership of Durable Goods  
                 and Costs and Benefits of Participation. 
Source: Primary household data. Average yearly costs and benefits calculated as detailed in Table 3. The graph 
excludes one MP4 wealth outlier. 
 
At the project level, the data collected does not point to capital constraints as an important 
cause of failure, although lack of funds was often mentioned by project members. In six of 
the nine projects visited (all except LP2, MP3, and LP5), the lack of funds/capital/money 
was mentioned as a hindrance to the success of the project. But suggesting that these 
projects lack working capital does not mean that with more capital they would necessarily 
bring about more benefits to their beneficiaries since other complementary factors are not 
present among beneficiaries, as discussed below, and embezzlement of project money is 
very common amongst project members (e.g., in LP4, LP5, LP1). Participants identified a  
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lack of capital in all projects, so that the mere existence of an identified lack of capital does 
not seem to discriminate comparatively successful from unsuccessful projects. In addition, 
(1) no project applied for a loan and did not obtain it, (2) the two projects that obtained a 
loan (LP5, MP2) are both virtually bankrupt, and (3) among the seven projects where no 
loan was applied for, the reasons invoked by project leaders for not having applied for a 
loan do not suggest credit rationing.
8 This echoes the findings of McCusker (2002, p.120), 
who argues that, despite an obvious lack of capital, `This is not to suggest that the 
government had never capitalised these farms. All the CPAs benefited from some sort of 
investment, however, in many cases the capital was either not maintained or had been 
destroyed in some way.’  
Availability of (Experienced) Labour 
We have seen in Section II that several authors have noted the lack of farming human 
capital among land reform beneficiaries in South Africa. At the household level, there is a 
positive correlation between family labour measured in adult-equivalent and gains from 
participation in labour tenant projects (40 per cent), as could be expected from the 
international literature on small family farms (see Kinsey and Binswanger, 1993). 
However, in the rest of the sample, where people do not live on project land and do not use 
family labour much, the correlation is strong too but in the opposite direction (-45 per 
cent). 
 
In addition, amongst households who report having some previous farming experience (27 
out of the 34 who answered this question), net gains are higher. The experienced group 
indeed received R6,285 on average, for a median of R0, whereas the inexperienced group 
received R5,144 on average for a median of –R16. The advantage of relevant farming 
experience seems much more discriminating however. The 24 households with an 
experience in the techniques used in the project received an average of R7,431 (median: 
R374) whereas the 10 households who did not have any farming experience or any 
experience with the particular techniques used received R2,735 on average for a median of 
-R60. 
 
On the contrary, due to labour tenants both having no or little education and deriving the 
largest gains from participation, the correlation between net gains and educational 
attainment is negative (see Figure 3). 
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Figure 3: Median Net Gains by Educational Achievement of the Household Head  
Source: Primary household data. Average yearly costs and benefits calculated as detailed in Table 3. `None or primary 
education’ category is based on 19 households and `above primary’ category on 15 households. 
 
At the project level, the lack of relevant farming and managerial skills is striking in all 
projects except the labour tenants’. 
 
Lack of farming skills is apparent in the case of LP1 and LP2, where cattle were reported 
to have been lost to disease without the beneficiaries knowing how to treat them. In LP3, 
the chairperson reported that the chicken rearing activity was not being very productive, 
with the animals `dying in large numbers’. In MP2, members `were not aware that [the 
service providers] were putting in the wrong pipes, and [they] did not know there was 
something called chloride you had to put in the water to purify it’, which subsequently 
created disastrous problems in their irrigation system.
9 
 
Managerial skills are also in short supply: in LP2, cattle sales were not based on the 
observation of market prices before a specific training was received six years after the start 
of operations, and a general lack of understanding of what is profitable seems prevalent, 
witness the remark of a focus group participant in LP1 that `though we all have two 
Mogans,
10 […] others may yield more but without realising that they have also spent more. 
There is no monitoring, people do not weigh cost against the yields’, statement confirmed 
by the figures obtained at the household level which show that all households interviewed 
in LP1 have net losses from their individual agricultural activity on project land (see Table 
3). 
 
In all successful projects except the least successful within this group (LP1), leaders said 
that what they lacked most was money to invest in production, whereas leaders in all the  
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non-successful projects except MP1 said that what they lacked most was skills, which 
suggests a primacy of skills over capital in determining albeit moderate success.  
Interestingly, in both LP3 and LP2, success has come despite the initial lack of some 
necessary know-how (farming skills in LP3 and marketing skills in LP2), which were 
partially compensated for by the regular support of an extension officer in LP3 and by 
specific training by the Agricultural Research Council in LP2. Nevertheless, in the project 
where the initial level of farming skills was arguably highest (LP5, where at least two 
participants out of nine were qualified farmers), production was initially very satisfactory 
but did not allow most participants to reap any benefits due to corruption. It seems 
therefore possible to conclude that (1) the availability of farming and management skills 
suitable for the nature of project operations is a necessary condition for success, (2) some 
skills can be successfully acquired by adequate training and support, and (3) appropriate 
skills may not suffice to ensure gains for participants if corruption is allowed to take place. 
Other Characteristics 
In their early study of the performance of land reform projects, Deininger and May (2000) 
find that three main characteristics are associated with better performance at the project 
level, namely that beneficiaries are willing to make cash contributions towards the project, 
small project size and flexible management structures, and receiving a loan from a third 
party. 
 
Our case study data does not confirm these findings. In our sample, households reported 
making cash contributions towards the collective activity only in two projects out of six 
with a collective activity, one successful (LP2) and one unsuccessful (LP4). Furthermore, 
the correlation between total costs of participation and neither gross nor net benefits is 
significantly different from zero at the household level.
11 Following Deininger and May’s 
recommendations, one of the main motivations behind the shift from SLAG to LRAD was 
to create smaller groups of beneficiaries. However, the present study shows that, despite 
the existence of coordination problems due to beneficiaries accessing land as a group, 
smaller size is by no means a guarantee of success. Only one of the not-successful projects 
sampled (MP2) comprises more than 30 households (a small size for South African projects 
standards), and the main reason for the failure of this project is not related to coordination 
problems, conflict, or other ills associated with its large size (200 households). The most 
shocking case of corruption,
12 which led to project collapse, was found in the smallest 
project (LP5, with nine members), and the two next smallest projects (MP1 with 26 
members and LP4 with 30) are not successful either. As to the role of loans, the only two  
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projects in our sample that (applied for and) obtained a loan (LP5, MP2) are the two 
projects who have collapsed. 
 
When land is accessed as a group, experience shows that the members of the group need to 
have a common background in order to limit conflict (Oberai, 1988). Some degree of 
conflict was observed in all projects except the labour tenants’. Somewhat surprisingly, in 
the projects surveyed, coming from the same village or even from the same family is no 
guarantee for a conflict-free project. But communities with a long history of land-related 
hardships in common (MP3, MP4, MP2) experience much less conflict. 
 
The very negative international experience with collective production would lead us to 
expect collective projects to perform less well. All redistributed farms in the sample are 
collectively owned by the beneficiary group. And except for the two labour tenant projects, 
all the farms sampled are mainly collective enterprises, which limits the potential to draw 
comparisons informing the role played by the collective approach to production and, a 
fortiori, to ownership. Although some of the collective enterprises are classified as 
successful (LP1, LP2, LP3), both projects based on individual production appear to bring 
about gains for their beneficiaries (MP3, MP4). In addition, whilst collective enterprises 
benefit at best only a handful of formal beneficiaries, the two individual small-scale farmer 
projects benefit most of their members. However, individual farming is not a sufficient 
condition for positive returns to land transfers: in the two projects mixing collective and 
individual farming, namely MP1 and LP1, neither the collective activity nor individual 
farming brought about any net benefits to the project members in the 12 months preceding 
the interview. 
 
One issue commonly raised by commentators of land reform in South Africa and other 
recent land reform episodes is the lack of government support once the land has been 
transferred (Deininger, 1999; Cliffe, 2000; Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC), 
2003; Borras, 2005). In the projects surveyed, the provision of extension services is indeed 
low (only 15 out of 37 households reported more than one extension officer visit per year). 
This is not surprising as one extension officer interviewed in Limpopo was in charge of just 
under 50 projects, up to 140 kilometres away from each other (including LP2, LP5, LP4 
and LP1). However, in projects where beneficiaries have been in control of the way land is 
used (namely, the labour tenant projects), the absence of extension services does not 
prevent land grantees from deriving net farming gains. Elsewhere, the main problem  
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appears to be that the business plans defining projects’ productive structures have proved 
particularly unrealistic in the face of the beneficiaries’ skills. 
 
In MP1, for instance, the business plan reckoned on the implementation of eight `small 
group production under larger group ownership’ units: `farming of tree crops and perennial 
crops under irrigation and vegetables; chicken, goat feedlot, muscuvy ducks; fresh produce 
packing, marketing and sale; general trading store; milling and packing operation; bakery; 
pleasure resort (restaurant, conference facility, tuck shop, picnic/braai); cultural village and 
craft/curio shop.’ (Scott, 1995, p.3). The business plan acknowledged that `the youth [were] 
virtually the only people possessing any degree or educational background’ and that 
training would be necessary to get the operations started (p.2). But the cash flow budget 
presented in the business plan (p.40) assumes that all operations will be functioning by 
month four. 
 
Finally, previous case studies have suggested that the distance between place of residence 
and redistributed farms is an important barrier to project success (HSRC, 2003; Wegerif, 
2004; Bradstock, 2005). For the households sampled in this study, distances varied between 
zero (for labour tenants) and 50 km. Although distance certainly is a hindrance, and a 
negative correlation is observed between distance to project land and net benefits from 




Figure 4: Relationship Between Distance to Project Land 
                 and Costs and Benefits of Participation 
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7. Conclusion 
Econometric evidence based on a national (Labour Force) survey confirms the negative 
impressions of commentators on the impact of the South African land reform programme 
on its beneficiaries, since it indicates that beneficiaries tend to be more food insecure 
compared to non-beneficiaries with similar observed characteristics. But lack of adequate 
data limits the opportunities for testing the robustness of these results to unobserved 
variable bias and prevents the investigation of the mechanisms at work. This paper 
combines this quantitative analysis with a qualitative study of primary data specifically 
collected to triangulate and complement the econometric analysis. 
 
One significant contribution of this study is to the emerging Q-squared literature, through 
the use of survey-based quantitative results to guide case-study data collection and thus 
improve the generalisability of the qualitative analysis. Although it is fairly common for 
researchers to collect data in different settings defined by characteristics expected to matter 
ex ante (for instance, to obtain a mix of agro-ecological zones or socio-economic 
characteristics), there is a general case to be made about using results from albeit 
incomplete observational data to target further data collection, be it for the purpose of case 
studies or for selecting sites to carry out randomised experiments.
14  
 
The paper’s other main contribution to the literature is through the documentation of 
financial costs and benefits of participation in land redistribution at the household level and 
a qualitative investigation of their correlates, in South Africa. The qualitative analysis 
indicates that participation in the land redistribution projects sampled here has brought 
about comparatively large net gains for labour tenants, and moderate net benefits for 
beneficiaries among the minority still involved in comparatively successful projects. But 
for the remaining majority of beneficiaries, small to moderate net losses are registered. As 
a consequence of the sampling strategy adopted, and consistent with the views expressed 
by the beneficiaries themselves and key informants, this conclusion is unlikely to be overly 
pessimistic if generalised to other land redistribution projects. Therefore, the qualitative 
analysis corroborates the econometric finding that the average land grantee is not made 
better-off by land transfers. 
 
The analysis of potential correlates of participation outcomes suggests that the binding 
constraint in most projects is lack of skills in line with the project operations rather than 
lack of capital. It also suggests that groups with a common history of land deprivation are  
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less prone to conflict, whereas group size and kinship do not appear to matter. Collective 
enterprises prove less likely to succeed than projects focusing on individual farming, but 
individual farmers in projects exhibiting a mix of individual and collective production do 
not achieve net gains either, so that individual farming per se may not be the panacea. 
Another factor often cited as preventing land reform beneficiaries from using redistributed 
land, namely distance to project land, is negatively correlated with net benefits from 
participation, but the pattern disappears when we exclude labour tenants, who live on the 
land transferred. 
 
The analysis of determinants of successful participation points at several policy 
recommendations to improve participation outcomes, namely (1) targeting households with 
relevant farming experience, and a common history of land deprivation; (2) improving 
extension services delivery; (3) avoiding collective project structures and, when such 
structures are in place, introducing random audits to prevent corruption; and, most 
importantly, (4) adapting land use plans to skill availability in order to limit the reliance on 
training (which may not be delivered on time) and reduce project dependence vis-à-vis 
government support. 
 
Such an evolutionist approach would be in contrast with the more transformationist take on 
land reform implemented so far in South Africa, where implementers’ preferences for a 
certain type of commercial agriculture have prevailed over the needs of beneficiaries. 
Three caveats should be emphasised here. First, it is important to note that, if the 
programme was altered to align farming models with beneficiaries’ skills, for instance by 
favouring independent small-scale family farming, then the capital constraint may become 
binding. If we limit the analysis to labour tenant projects, where land is operated on a 
family basis, participation gains are found to be more robustly correlated with initial wealth 
than in other projects, suggesting that the absence of strong capital constraints may not hold 
in family farm projects. Second, official assessments of land quality were not accessible for 
most projects, and the study’s financial constraints prevented obtaining an independent 
technical assessment. The question of whether land channelled through land reform is of 
below-average potential is an interesting one, and there is evidence that transactions outside 
the land reform programme involve better quality land (Lyne and Ferrer, 2006). A desirable 
avenue for future research would thus be to consider rigorously the impact of land quality 
and access to water on project performance. The third and more general caveat is that the 
policy recommendations put forward here are based on the analysis of the impact of land  
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transfers from the point of view of beneficiary households, and not from a social welfare 
standpoint. This study makes clear that, even in comparatively successful projects, where 
some benefits accrue to participants, returns can be quite low. This opens the important 
questions, which are beyond the scope of the present analysis, of the economic desirability 
and political feasibility of land redistribution in its current form. The policy 
recommendations drawn from the present analysis at least suggest that individual returns to 
land transfers could be improved at comparatively low cost. But irrespective of the cost-
effectiveness of land reform in a narrow accounting sense, the threat of political instability 
and reduced long-term economic prosperity that could follow from failure to reform should 
continue to loom large over the debate surrounding land redistribution in South Africa in 
the foreseeable future.  
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Online Appendix 
A- Labour Force Survey Data 
A1- Further Discussion of LFS Data 
In the LFS, a majority of land grantees are observed in urban areas, especially in the 2002 
and 2003 rounds (the share of urban land grantees is 59% in 2001, 84% in 2002 and 87% in 
2003). There is no rural/urban information in the 2004 wave. 
Several factors may explain these striking figures. First, a significant number of 
beneficiaries may have accessed land through the land redistribution programme whilst 
living in a town or city. The scope of the land redistribution programme has been wide-
ranging, as it was set up with the aim to “include the urban and rural very poor, labour 
tenants, farm workers as well as new entrants to agriculture” (Department of Land Affairs, 
1997). There are no published statistics about the urban/rural classification of beneficiaries 
of land redistribution in South Africa, so that there is only limited scope to formally 
compare the actual urban proportion of beneficiaries and that of the beneficiaries in the 
LFS datasets. However, the Department of Land Affairs itself has expressed concerns that 
many land reform beneficiaries were urban dwellers who did not till the land transferred to 
them (Arenstein, 1999; Lodge, 2003, p.78). This is supported by a recent unpublished 
review commissioned by the DLA, which effectively consisted of a census of all 
redistribution projects that had been delivered from 2001-2006. The study found that “Of 
all projects surveyed, in 43% of projects beneficiaries originated from urban/peri-urban 
areas” (Umhlaba Rural Services, 2008, p. 58). The discrepancy between these project-level 
figures and the household-level LFS figures may be due to projects involving urban 
beneficiaries being larger than average, or, as suggested by an anonymous referee, could 
relate to the fact that the Review interviewed not all beneficiaries, but largely those who 
were still around, who are likely disproportionately rural. 
Second, in the context of South Africa, where circular migration between urban and rural 
areas is widespread (see Statistics South Africa, 2006), it may be the case that a number of 
these apparent urban beneficiaries are in fact members of a multiple-home household with 
another home in a rural area. Indeed, a common household structure in South Africa is that 
of the “multilocal” household, i.e. a situation in which the “household is spatially divided 
into different components across two or more places for members to utilise the benefits of 
the different places, while staying linked as a household” (Statistics South Africa, 2006, 
p.23). Third, it is possible that a number of these apparently urban land grantees are people 
who have come to urban areas after receiving land in rural areas. Although data limitations  
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prevent checking this hypothesis, this could account for a large number of “urban 
beneficiaries” given the high levels of project abandonment (at least 60 per cent in the non-
land-tenant projects surveyed for this paper), and multiple accounts of beneficiaries having 
left to go find jobs in towns and cities heard during primary data collection. 
Importantly, propensity score matching estimates (for South Africa as a whole) suggest that 
the conclusions of the quantitative analysis are not led by the urban sample (see Appendix 
Table A1 below). Unfortunately, it is not possible to restrict the provincial regressions of 
the paper’s Table 1 to rural beneficiaries because this would lead to very small provincial 
samples for most provinces, especially since this renders all LFS 2004 observations, i.e., a 
third of observations of land grantees, unusable (since there is no rural/urban data for this 
round). 
 
Appendix Table A1. Propensity Score Matching Estimates for Different Sub-samples 
 
 
Set of regressors entering 




education dummies,   
whether female head, 
 whether receiving benefits, 
whether single parent, 
household size, 





All regressors in  




Number of beneficiaries in 
sub-sample 
(matched) 
Dependent variable  Food insecurity   Food insecurity   























Source: sample of households headed by a black individual in Statistics South Africa’s Labour Force Survey. Provincial 
samples are obtained by stacking the four LFS surveys for which the relevant information is available, namely the 
September 2001, 2002, 2003 and 2004 rounds. Nearest neighbour matching algorithm by Leuven and Sianesi (2003). 
Bootstrapped standard errors (in brackets) partially correct for the fact that some observations may be sampled in more 
than one round, but cannot be identified between rounds. The balancing property is satisfied for all estimates. Namely, 
individual t-tests cannot reject the equality of means for beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries for each regressor included 
in the propensity score equation. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
aThere is no rural/urban information in the 








   
29
A2- Description of Variables 
Appendix Table A2: Details of Variables Used in the Quantitative Analysis 
Variable Details 
Education dummies  Set of 4 dummy variables controlling for the educational level of the household head: primary, 
lower secondary, senior secondary, and higher (the omitted category is `no schooling’). 
Benefits  Equals one if the household receives any of the following welfare grants, and zero otherwise: 
old age or disability pension, child support grant, care dependency grant, foster care grant, grant 
in aid, social relief. Eligibility for welfare grants is not linked to receiving a land grant or not. 
Ethnic Dummies  Set of dummies controlling for the main language spoken at home: Debele, Xhosa, Zulu, Sotho, 
Sepedi, Tswana, Siswati, Tsonga, English. 
 
 
B- Case Study Data 
B1- Sampling of Households within Projects 
The sampling of households to be interviewed individually within each project follows the 
same general principle: purposeful sampling was preferred when there was a clear 
argument in favour of it (for instance, in the case of MP2, only three out of the 200 formal 
beneficiaries had been employed on a full-time basis on the project, and so we purposefully 
sampled one of these three beneficiaries), and ‘random’ sampling was opted for otherwise. 
The word ‘random’ is put in inverted commas because the high rate of project desertion, 
migration, and the lack of homogeneity in project communities did not allow a strict 
random sampling of households within projects. In practice, the sampling of up to 
(depending on project size) 30 participants in each official project member list was 
performed randomly using Excel©. Fieldworkers would then ask, at the end of focus group 
discussions between project beneficiaries, following the order of the random draw, if focus 
group participants knew who the land grant beneficiary was, and where/how they could be 
contacted. It became clear from the piloting stage that a large proportion of formal 
beneficiaries were unknown from focus group participants and/or had moved far away 
(Johannesburg in many cases), and/or were not on civil terms with other project members 
so that, in some extreme cases such as that of LP1, five randomly picked beneficiaries had 
to be called for each identifiable household subsequently interviewed. 
 
B2- Reliability of the Primary Data 
The main approach adopted to check the reliability of the household data has been to 
triangulate these internally. This was done in two ways: first, we checked the internal  
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coherence of the information provided by each household; second, we checked the 
information obtained in the household questionnaires against the information obtained 
outside household interviews, i.e., during focus group discussions with beneficiaries, 
interviews with officials involved in the project, and structured interviews with project 
leaders. 
Only two inconsistencies of notable degree were observed. These were in terms of 
participation costs in the labour tenant projects and in LP4. More specifically, the 
application costs reported by some labour tenants (and especially one of the `outliers’ 
already mentioned in the paper p.13) were well above those suggested by the projects’ 
representatives. It is unclear which source is more accurate, the labour tenants interviewed 
using the household questionnaires, or their projects’ representatives. However, the 
conclusions of the case studies would not be significantly altered if we assumed the 
projects’ authorities were correct, in the sense that the error in using the higher costs 
reported by the households would be to underestimate net benefits, and the study already 
concludes that labour tenants in our sample experience large participation gains. 
Conversely, in LP4, the chairperson reported twice as large household cash contributions 
than households did. But if the chairperson were right, then it would only reinforce the 
conclusion, based on household data, that participants in LP4 have experienced moderate 
losses. 
There are no comparable external data on individual costs and benefits of participation. 
However, some of the data collected can be checked against a relevant external source, 
namely the Quality of Life Surveys (QoLS) commissioned by the Department of Land 
Affairs. Four of these surveys have been commissioned, but only two (1998/1999 and 2001) 
have been circulated, and which interviewed two different random samples of beneficiaries. 
This leaves two surveys with which to compare some of our case studies data. Indeed, 
similar to these surveys, we have collected data on expenditure, livestock ownership, 
ownership of agricultural equipment, and household durable goods. Expenditure data can 
be deflated using Statistics South Africa CPI index, but count data for ownership of various 
goods cannot, which should be borne in mind when comparing figures between the QoLS 
(1999 and 2000) with the data collected in 2007 for our study. 
As can be seen in the first row of Appendix Table B1 below, mean household expenditure 
for beneficiaries surveyed for the 2001 QoLS in Limpopo (R673) and Mpumalanga (R894) 
is quite similar to the deflated average expenditure reported by households in our 2007 
survey (R747).   
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Livestock ownership varies a lot between the two QoLS, going from 39 per cent to 24 per 
cent on average. This illustrates the limits of comparing characteristics of different samples 
of land reform beneficiaries, given their heterogeneity. In our sample, the per centage of 
households who own livestock is 56 per cent for the whole sample, but falls to 37 per cent 
when excluding labour tenants, which illustrates once more the heterogeneity of 
beneficiaries. It is difficult to interpret the differences across ours and the QoLS samples, 
but it does not seem to indicate any `problem’ with the case studies data. 
  Similarly, ownership of agricultural equipment is higher in our case studies sample, but is 
consistent with the QoLS figures (notably in view of the increase observed between 
1998/99 and 2001). 
Finally, ownership of household durable goods is also broadly in line between the QoLS 
and our case studies data.  
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Appendix Table B1: Comparison of primary data with Quality of Life Surveys 
    Quality of Life Surveys    Primary Data   
   1998/99  2001    1999
a 2001









      
 
Household Expenditure    926  894  673  1007    647
b 747









(37 % excluding 
labour tenants) 
 
Ownership of agricultural 
equipment  
 
64 %  68 %  87 %  73 %        90 % 
 
                    




































Quality of Life Surveys figures as reported by Ahmed et al. (2003) pp.224-227 and Tables 6.5, 6.9 and 6.13. Unless 
specified otherwise, values are in Rand.  
a deflated by Statistics South Africa CPI index. 
bExcluding one outlier 
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B3 – Description of Variables 
Appendix Table B2: Details of Variables Used in the Qualitative Analysis 
Livestock, physical capital, and durable goods: 
Livestock categories in the household questionnaire: cattle, sheep/goats/pigs, poultry, horse/donkey, other.  
Physical capital categories in the household questionnaire: motor vehicle including cars and bakkies (not 
tractors), motorcycle, bicycle, plough, tractor, animal cart, hand tools for farming, hand tools for off-farm 
activities, other. 
Durable goods categories in the household questionnaire: furniture, household appliances, TV/VCR/Radio, 
telephone, jewellery/watches/gold items. 
Value: as valued by the household (at replacement value) when such information is not missing in the 
household questionnaires. Otherwise, reported items are valued at the average value reported by respondents 
for similar items.  
Value of agricultural production: 
Crops: the value of crop output is calculated as the quantity of crops harvested in the past 12 months minus 
crops given to pay for hired labour or for rent, priced at the national average retail prices for these crops 
according to data from the Department of Agriculture, corrected for inflation (using Statistics South Africa 
Consumer Price Index data). The crops are not valued according to the information collected from 
households as the unit price variations from one household to the other are unreasonably wide. 
Livestock: for animals other than cattle, livestock output is valued as the sum of the number of each type of 
animal sold or slaughtered minus animals bought in the past 12 months, times the average unit sale price 
reported by the households interviewed. For cattle, the annual produce was computed as the value of cattle 
sold plus the value of cattle slaughtered. The value of cattle bought was not imputed due to the particular 
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C- Overview of Sampled Projects 
 
Figure 1: Map of Limpopo 
 
Source: www.srsa.gov.za. The circled area indicates where the sampled projects are located. 
 
Data collection in Limpopo took place in January 2007. The three projects purposefully 
sampled as successful in Limpopo were LP1, LP2, and LP3. At the end of 1997, a group of 
398 household constituted as LP1 CPA
1 acquired a 2,240 ha farm situated in the Capricorn 
municipality about 20 km West of the provincial capital Polokwane. The beneficiaries 
came from various villages up to around 30 km away from the farm. Both the initial project 
leaders and the Provincial Land Reform Office (PLRO) official first in charge of the 
project have changed, so that few details of the genesis of the project emerged during data 
collection. The main activity on the farm has been a collective cattle operation. This cattle 
operation started in 1997, and, in 2006, the cattle activity’s turnover has reached R41,000. 
However, in that year, the largest activity in terms of sales was maize (R42,000), which has 
been produced collectively since 2005. The other source of income for the project comes 
from renting out grazing land (for a total of R24,000 in 2006). In the two years preceding 
data collection, chicken rearing has been organised by two beneficiaries and part of the 
farm land has been divided equally between all project participants, so that just over 2 ha of 
land have been allocated to each beneficiary. Organisational and production difficulties 
have so far prevented the distribution of any profits between beneficiaries, since expenses 
have systematically exceeded income. Nevertheless, LP1 has consistently been viewed in a 
positive light in comparison to other land reform projects, by both key informants and a 
researcher who visited the project in 1999-2000 (McCusker, 2002). But only the two farm 
                                                 
1 Communal Property Association.  
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workers involved in chicken production and some beneficiaries who sell part of their 
production from their private plot receive any financial reward from participation, and 
benefits in kind are limited to the possibility of renting the farm tractor at a discounted rate, 
certain free seeds, a piece of meat once a year when one animal is slaughtered, and if the 
annual maize harvest is good, one bag of maize meal. Members who are still active meet 
monthly, whereas the executive committee members meet every fortnight. About 100 
members are still involved according to project members, although we counted less than 50 
people present at the meeting we attended. Besides attending these meetings, the reality of 
participation varies across project members from being present at the farm several times a 
week to ensure the functioning of the collective cattle and maize operations (for a few 
committed members only), contributing occasional labour and small amounts of money for 
the communal enterprise, and/or farming one’s individual plot.  
The second Limpopo project purposefully sampled as successful is LP2. In 1998, this CPA 
of 126 households acquired a farm of 1,655 ha in the Capricorn municipality, about 45 km 
East of Polokwane. The land transfer was initiated by the former landowner, who contacted 
the authorities and suggested that they would buy his farm to meet the needs of nearby 
villagers who would occasionally approach him to rent grazing land. Ultimately however, 
the group was formed by households from villages up to 15 km away from the farm, under 
a business plan in which land use was restricted to a collective livestock enterprise, and 
forbidding the grazing of livestock owned individually by beneficiary households. The 
collective cattle enterprise started in 1999 and was still running at the time of data 
collection, but a piggery had to be shut down due to the poor standards to which the pigs 
were being maintained. The cattle enterprise had a turnover of R146,419 in 2006. The other 
source of income for the project as a whole comes from the renting out of the project’s 
tractor and truck (about R30,000 in 2006). In the two years preceding data collection, a 
small number among the 46 beneficiaries who remain active have been carrying out group 
crop production. 20 people were involved in this crop operation in 2005, but only 6 in 
2006, as the others have been discouraged by the destruction of crops by wild animals in 
the previous year. In 2006, the beneficiaries involved in crop production obtained 6 bags of 
80 kg of maize meal each. Most participants in LP2 have contributed R20 per month since 
1999 towards the collective livestock enterprise, and dividends started to be distributed in 
2004. Until then, only the two fulltime farm workers received any income in cash or kind 
from the project. 
The third Limpopo project sampled purposefully as successful is LP3. This LRAD project 
was initiated in 2002, and after three years of efforts by the group’s leaders, the 177 ha  
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farm was finally transferred. It is situated in the Mopani municipality, about 20 km East of 
Tzaneen. The beneficiary group was initially composed by 97 individuals, most of them 
from the same village 35 km away from the farm, along with some of the 10 farm workers 
employed by the previous landowner. Contrary to the two previous projects, for which 
beneficiaries have not relocated to the farm, the eight beneficiaries currently still involved 
in the farm stay in the farm and only go back home at the weekend. They receive monthly 
salaries between R800 and R3,000 according to their role. The two significant activities 
taking place on the farm are chicken production (R175,000 turnover in 2006) and mango 
production (turnover in 2006: R40,000).  
The last two projects sampled in Limpopo were purposefully sampled as unsuccessful (LP4 
and LP5), and happened to be both situated in the Capricorn municipality. The 30 LRAD 
beneficiaries of LP4 live in a township about 35 km East of Polokwane, and applied for 
grants to buy a 24 ha farm some 20 km West of the provincial capital in 2002. Difficulties 
were noted at an early stage (e.g., by Wegerif, 2004), and the history of the project has 
been scarred with social conflict. In 2005, maize was collectively ploughed by most 
beneficiaries, but the profits from the sales disappeared in the hands of the chairperson, 
along with some of the farm’s assets. The PLRO has attempted to revive the project, and 
despite several beneficiaries having lost interest in the project due to their initial 
predicament, six beneficiaries remain committed to the farm and have ploughed again in 
December 2006 at their own costs (including that of hired labourers).  
The second unsuccessful project purposefully sampled in Limpopo is an LRAD project of 
nine relatives (LP5), who obtained a chicken operation of nine hectares in 2003. The farm 
was up and running, and seemingly quite successful for two years, and the seven 
beneficiaries who worked in the farm on a daily basis accepted the delay in payment 
presented by the chairperson as a necessary step towards healthy project finances. 
However, the chairperson and treasurer eventually disappeared with the project profits. At 
the time of data collection, one beneficiary was attempting to revive the project. But due to 
the circumstances, no focus group discussion or household interviews were attempted. The 
information regarding this project is based on an in-depth interview with the beneficiary 
who is still active and interviews with officials who have worked with this project.     
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Figure 2: Map of Mpumalanga 
 
Source: www.srsa.gov.za. The circled area indicates where the sampled projects are located. 
Data collection in Mpumalanga took place in February/March 2007. In this province, three 
projects were sampled randomly: MP1, MP2, and MP3. To compensate for the likely 
under-sampling of labour tenant projects and for replication purposes, a second labour 
tenant project was purposefully sampled (MP4).  
MP1 is a project of 26 households (initially), who were encouraged by the former 
landowner to apply for grants in order to acquire part of his farm in 1994. Their 28 ha farm 
portion is situated in the Mbombela municipality, about 30 km North of Nelspruit. The 
adjacent portion was redistributed to another land redistribution project. On MP1’s portion, 
the ambitious plan drawn by the consultant appointed by the PLRO was to operate both 
agricultural and non-agricultural commercial activities (see paper p.29). In the first year 
after land was transferred, some collective crop production was carried out by the 
beneficiaries but the quantities harvested were minimal due to the constant intrusion of 
thieves and animals. Since this disappointing first harvest, and except for the use of a farm 
building by the chairperson for a private non-agricultural business, the only use of the land 
has been individual subsistence farming (with land plots being allocated by the chairperson, 
who also is the wife of the traditional chief). The beneficiaries of the project live in 
different villages anything between 500 meters to about 10 km away from the farm. Crops 
have been harvested by a number of participants in some years, but participants continually 
face difficulties in harvesting the produce of their efforts, as crops are reported to have 
been stolen, eaten by animals, and not having been harvested due to drought. 
The MP2 project is a group of 200 households, composed mainly of people who have been 
evicted from their nearby land at different dates since the 1980s, due to the expansion of a  
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local lake. They have been engaged in a struggle to access land for agricultural purposes 
since their relocation in a tribal authority where they felt they were not given access to 
sufficient land. However, only in 1997 did they obtain SLAG grants to purchase a run 
down 265 ha farm in the high-potential Nkomazi municipality (just over 100 km East of the 
provincial capital Nelspruit). The farm is situated seven km away from where most 
beneficiaries lived at the time of the transfer. Except for a small loan contracted by LP5 
(R7,000), MP2 is the only group in the sample who has borrowed money. They contracted 
an establishment loan of just over one million Rand from the Land Bank in 1997 to start up 
sugarcane and citrus production. Only the sugarcane operation ever started, and the project 
was at first seen by observers as a success story (e.g., in Lodge, 2003). But data collected 
during fieldwork showed that only a small minority of beneficiaries ever received any 
income from the project. The project was intended to provide full time work for 80 
beneficiaries and distribute dividends to all (Lodge, 2003). In reality, primary data 
collection revealed that during the two years during which production took place, only 
three full time workers were employed by the project and paid R500 per month. In the first 
year and a half, about 20 labourers would get R10 per day worked (about 10 days per 
month). No dividends were ever distributed due to lack of profits (despite the R250,000 
and R160,000 sales revenue in 1998 and 1999, respectively). When torrential rains 
destroyed part of the crops in 1999 and eventually led to the end of activities in 2000, 
participants were often working for no pay on the farm. Despite efforts by twenty or so 
beneficiaries to revive the project, and earlier attempts by the Department of Agriculture 
(DoA) to reorganise operations, it seems unlikely that production will resume, as the debt 
had accumulated to R1.6 million at the time of data collection.    
The third and last randomly sampled project in Mpumalanga is MP3, a labour tenant 
project settled as LRAD about 100 km North West of Nelspruit in the Thaba Chweu 
municipality. In 2002, the former landowner approached the PLRO offering to sell a 
portion of his estate for a group of labour tenants he had been trying to evict. Thirty three 
individuals were gathered to apply for grants which allowed the purchase of this 214 ha 
farm portion. The majority of applicants were living in different portions of the estate, and 
relocated in 2003 from areas between one and 18 km away from their current homestead. 
The chairperson reported that the project had no business plan, and so far, 90 ha of project 
land has been used as communal grazing land for the animals individually owned by the 
participant households, whilst crop production is taking place on individual household plots 
of between about one and 4 ha.  
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The last project sampled in Mpumalanga (MP4) is a purposefully sampled labour tenant 
project adjacent to MP3. Beneficiaries have been living on the farm now purchased through 
LRAD grants for decades. In 2000, the former landlord appointed a new farm manager who 
prohibited tenants from cropping land on the farm. Eviction orders were issued against the 
tenants, who complained to the national Department of Land Affairs in Pretoria, and 
eventually obtained 38 land grants to purchase their 188 ha farm. According to the project 
leader, the land was officially transferred in September 2006, even though no title has been 
issued yet. Despite the existence of a business plan for a commercial crop enterprise, the 
former labour tenants have been using their land in a way similar to MP3, that is to say, 
using about half the farm area as communal grazing land for their individually owned 
livestock whilst cropping is carried out on individual plots of generally less than 4 ha.  
                                                 
Endnotes: 
1 Definitions have not been standardised yet and warrant clarification. In this paper, the `quantitative’ component refers 
to econometric estimates based on secondary, nationally representative household data. The `qualitative’ aspect refers to 
the in-depth analysis of numerical and textual data obtained from a small, purposefully selected sample of beneficiaries 
using intensive data collection tools. 
2 As a consequence, 58 per cent of the beneficiary population aged 15 years and older surveyed in Ahmed et al. (2003, 
p.34) did not have any farming experience before accessing the land reform project. 
3 Up until May 2008, LRAD grants ranged from R20,000 for a personal contribution of R5,000 (generally under the 
form of labour, the so called `sweat equity`) up to R100,000 for a personal contribution of R400,000. A revised grant 
scale was approved in May 2008, so that the minimum grant amount is now R111,152 for a personal contribution of 
R13,000 and goes up to a maximum of R430,857 for a personal contribution of R500,000.  
4 The main variables of interest for this study are available in all September waves from 2001 to 2004. Despite being 
advertised as a panel dataset and 80 per cent of each wave sample being interviewed again in the following wave, given 
individuals and households cannot be identified between waves, which precludes the use of panel data techniques. 
Notice however that no household sampled in the 2001 wave could still be interviewed in the 2004 wave. 
5 The main concern raised by relying on this classification is that government officials are stakeholders in the land 
reform process and may therefore try to influence the results of the analysis. However, since both PLRO officials (who 
might be suspected of covering up the failings of land reform, and thus might try to hide truly unsuccessful projects) 
and DoA staff (who were outspokenly critical of the government’s approach to land reform) agreed on the 
classification, we are confident that the use of this classification introduced no major bias in the analysis.  
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6 More specifically, this informant reported being in charge of 48 redistribution projects, broken down as 32 SLAG 
projects, 12 group LRAD projects, and four individual LRAD projects. The 4 individual LRAD projects were said to be 
doing very well, and only six out of the 32 SLAG `showing some light of development’ (including LP1 and LP2). He 
refused to comment on the 12 group LRAD projects (including LP4 and LP5) indicating that it was too early to 
comment (although some of these projects had been functioning for over four years). 
7 Questionnaires used for the household and project authority interviews, as well as the focus group schedule are 
available upon request. 
8 One project leader out of the seven said they did not apply for a loan because they did not need to, and five said that 
they did not apply because they would not have been able to repay the loan (which does not suggest rationing in the 
sense that the marginal product of capital is not higher than its marginal cost). 
9 It has not been possible to check with relevant authorities the exact nature of the irrigation-related technical problems 
encountered by MP2, and so this quote may not reflect the precise nature of the problem. 
10 Mogans are the most usual unit used by black South Africans to measure land area. It comes from the Afrikaans 
`Morgen’, and one hectare is equal to just under 1.17 Morgen/Mogan.   
11 One possible explanation for the divergence between Deininger and May’s findings and our own is that causality goes 
in both directions, and one or the other effect dominates according to the project `life cycle’: at an early stage, 
individual contributions signal motivation and create effort incentives, but later on, higher contributions are in part 
caused by project difficulties. 
12 This redistributed farm was up and running, and seemingly quite successful for the two first years, during which 
period the seven beneficiaries who worked on the farm on a daily basis were not paid. They accepted the delay in 
payment presented by the chairperson as a necessary step towards healthy project finances. However, the chairperson 
and treasurer eventually disappeared with the project profits. 
13 However, comparison may be limited by the difference in the magnitude of the distances involved in other studies: in 
some projects mentioned in Wegerif (2004), distances involved are above 100 km, and in projects studied by Bradstock 
(2005), beneficiaries live up to 200 km away from their project. 
14   For instance, in the case of randomised field experiments, which also face issues of external validity or 
`generalisability’, targeting areas with different levels of a previously estimated treatment effect would reinforce the 
value of replication. As put by Banerjee and Duflo (2008), `To address [both] concerns about generalisation, actual 
replication studies need to be carried out. Additional experiments have to be conducted in different locations, with 
different teams. If we have a theory that tells us where the effects are likely to be different, we focus the extra 
experiments there. If not, we should ideally choose random locations within the relevant domain.’ In the absence of  
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clear theoretical predictions, but when some survey-based estimates are available, a fruitful alternative could be to 
divide the population according to the size of the treatment effect based on observational data, and then randomly 
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